In her insightful post discussing a
former rhetorical showdown, Anjeli mentions that relative, contingent
information suits the cause of her friend, “the better arguer,” and thereby that
information becomes the opponent’s “truth.” I really enjoyed that Anjeli took
on this baffling facet of rhetoric that seeks to generate relative truths,
similar to what Ramage explains as the indelible task of Rhetorical People who
get between Laws of Contradictions, as opposed to the Serious People. It seems
a precarious task at best…constantly generating the wisdom to know we can’t always
have all the answers, and even when we do, there are intangible properties of
conversation that virtually or perceptually trump the existence of a more “accurate”
truth simply because it was “better argued,” as Anjeli shows us. I think what
most intrigues me about her reaction to this phenomenon, though, is the
inclination to associate rhetoric’s properties with an allegiance to subjective
knowledge. I mention this because where I currently come from, in the conversation
of rhetoric, is a very uncertain place of what constitutes subjective
knowledge, or if such a category is even adequate to describe the nature of
epistemology as it morphs into relative rhetorical truths. Hold tight, brb…
I was a bit amused to encounter
George Kennedy’s work in this first week of class after initially being
introduced to him in another work: “Play of Sniffication: Coyotes Sing in the
Margins” by Natasha Seegart. Though Seegart laments the limited attention
Kennedy’s article received for its expansive and inclusive definition of “rhetoric
as energy,” she also explains in her work a reason why perhaps this definition
didn’t hold prolonged sway—it was simply too
expansive. General physical laws of the universe shows us that all matter is comprised of compressed
energy, and thereby the definition of rhetoric as energy is sweet for its open
invitation to the playground, but it is not realistically helpful because
literally everything would be
rhetoric. Seegart alternatively defines rhetoric as a “relational force of
signals,” which, to me, captures the expansiveness rhetoric deserves, without
creating futile, limitless boundaries.
This brings me back to the binary of objective
and subjective knowledge because I absolutely concur with definitions of
rhetoric that attribute agency to not just human subjects, but virtually anywhere
a “signal” can exist. Notions of subjective and objective knowledge are
constructs of human perception, but what precedes these constructs are
faculties of the mind, or signals sent, that are able to conceive of such a
construct in the first place, and therefore I don’t believe either category is
fully adequate to describe the nature of knowledge as both can be rhetorically
conceived. I also believe this means we have to attribute rhetorical agency to
the faculties able to construct knowledge, allowing us to explore the
constructs of rhetoric in the first place. If we know “there is no recipe (EVER) that can guide the
slow-food cooking” (Ramage 31) of rhetoric, then there is something undeniably
subversive about claiming the constant
truth of inchoate recipes describing knowledge, and therefore rhetorical objectivity
and subjectivity implode.
--Kimbo Hoover
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